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Abstract 
  This paper investigates three sequential-move games with a capitalist firm, a labour-managed firm 
and a state-owned firm. The first game is as follows. In stage one, the capitalist firm chooses its output 
level. In stage two, the other firms choose their output levels simultaneously and independently. In 
stage three, the market opens and all firms sell their outputs. The structures of the second and third 
games are nearly identical and differ only in order in which the firms choose output levels in the first 
two stages. The paper discusses the equilibrium outcomes of the three sequential-move games. 
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1. Introduction 
  The assumptions of Cournot (simultaneous move) and Stackelberg (sequential move) behaviour are 
widely used in analyzing oligopoly games. As it is very well known, the profit-maximizing Stackelberg 
leader can get a profit higher than the follower by committing to a high quantity. Many studies on 
mixed oligopoly with state-owned and capitalist firms discuss simultaneous-move games. However, 
only some studies investigate sequential-move games. For example, Poyago-Theotoky (2001) 
investigates the role that production subsidies play in a quantity-setting mixed market, and shows that 
the optimal subsidy and equilibrium output levels are identical irrespective of whether the state-owned 
firm moves simultaneously with the capitalist firms or the state-owned firm acts as a Stackelberg leader. 
Wang and Mukherjee (2012) compare economic welfare under different numbers of capitalist firms, 
and show that the entry of capitalist firms increases the state-owned firm’s profit, industry profit and 
economic welfare at the expenses of the consumers. Tao, Zhu and Zou (2013) study and compare 
economic welfare in a sequential-move mixed duopoly when either the state-own firm or the capitalist 
firm acts as the leader. They demonstrate that the fact that which firm is the leader affects economic 
welfare and that whether firms compete in quantity or price also affects the optimal choice of market 
leader. 
  Furthermore, some studies on mixed oligopoly comprising labour-managed firms examine 
sequential-move games. For example, Okuguchi (1993) considers Bertrand and Cournot duopoly 
games where two labour-managed firms produce differentiated goods, and shows that followership is 
more advantageous than leadership in both Bertrand-Stackelberg and Cournot-Stackelberg duopoly 
games. Lambertini (1997) examines an endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model in which a capitalist 
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firm competes with a labour-managed firm, and demonstrates that the quantity-setting game has a 
unique equilibrium with the capitalist firm in the leader’s role and the labour-managed firm in the 
follower’s role. Okuguchi and Serizawa (1998) examine Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly games in 
which two labour-managed firms coexist with each other, and show that the Cournot firm’s output is 
larger than the Stackelberg follower’s output, which in turn is larger than the leader’s output. 
  On the other hand, there are few theoretical researches on sequential-move mixed oligopoly with 
state-owned and labour-managed firms. 
  We examine three sequential-move games with a capitalist firm, a labour-managed firm and a 
state-owned firm. The first game runs as follows. In the first stage, the capitalist firm chooses its output 
level. In the second stage, the other firms choose their output levels simultaneously and independently. 
The structures of the second and third games are nearly identical and differ only in order in which the 
firms choose output levels in the two stages. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no 
previous work dealing with such economic situation. The paper discusses the equilibrium outcomes of 
the three sequential-move games. 
  The purpose of this study is to show the equilibrium outcomes of three sequential-move games 
comprising of a capitalist firm, a labour-managed firm and a state-owned firm. 
  The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic model. 
The third section derives the reaction functions for all firms. The fourth section discusses each 
equilibrium outcome of three sequential-move games. The last section concludes the paper. All 
propositions are proved in the appendix. 
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2. Basic setting 
  Let us consider an economy composed of one capitalist firm (firm C), one labour-managed firm 
(firm L) and one state-owned firm (firm S). Throughout this paper, subscripts C, L and S denote firm C, 
firm L and firm S, respectively. In addition, when i, j and k are used to refer to firms in an expression, 
they should be understood to represent C, L and S with i ≠ j ≠ k. There is no possibility of entry or exit. 
The triopolists produce perfectly substitutable goods. The inverse demand function is ( )P Q , where 
C L SQ q q q . We assume that 
2 2 2 2 2
C L S( ) 0d P dQ P q P q P q  and dP dQ  
2 2 0iq d P dQ .  This assumption allows a linear inverse demand function which is adopted in 
many studies of mixed oligopoly (e.g., see Stewart, 1991; Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Lambertini, 
1997; Lambertini and Rossini, 1998; Ohnishi, 2009). 
  We consider the following timing. In stage one, firm i chooses its output level. In stage two, firm j 
and firm k choose their output levels simultaneously and independently. In stage three, the market 
opens and all firms sell their outputs. 
  Each firm’s profit i  is 
  C L S( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,i i i iq q q P Q q w q r q f                                      (1) 
where w  represents the labour cost function, r  is the capital cost function, and 0f  is the fixed 
cost. We assume 0idw dq , 
2 2 0id w dq , 0idr dq  and 
2 2 0id r dq .
1  Firm C chooses 
                                                 
1 We assume that the triopologists face the same cost function and the marginal cost of production is 
increasing. If the marginal cost of production is constant or decreasing, then firm S will produce where 
price is equal to marginal cost of production, and will enjoy monopoly. Therefore, this assumption is 
adopted in many papers studying mixed oligopoly markets (e.g. Harris and Wiens, 1980; Delbono and 
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C 0q  in order to maximize its own profit. 
  Economic welfare W is 
  C L S S S C C L L0( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 .
Q
W q q q P x dx w q r q w q r q w q r q f            (2) 
Firm S chooses S 0q  in order to maximize economic welfare. 
  Firm L’s income per worker L  is 
  L LL C L S
L
( ) ( )( , , ) ,
( )
P Q q r q fq q q
l q
                                          (3) 
where l  represents the labour input function. We assume that 0idl dq  and 
2 2 0id l dq . Firm L 
sets L 0q  in order to maximize income per worker. 
  Throughout this study, we adopt subgame perfection as our solution concept. Since the inverse 
demand function is defined only for non-negative outputs, it is ensured that all outputs obtained in 
equilibrium are non-negative. 
 
 
3. Reaction functions 
  First, we consider firm C’s best response, which is defined by 
  
C
C L S C C C0
( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( ) .
q
R q q P Q q w q r q f                               (4) 
  Firm C aims to maximize its profit with respect to Cq , given Lq and Sq . The equilibrium outcome 
needs to satisfy the following conditions: The first-order condition for (4) is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Rossini, 1992; Delbono and Scarpa, 1995; Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2003; 
Ohnishi, 2008; Wang and Wang, 2009). 
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  C
C C
0,dP dw drq P
dQ dq dq
                                                 (5) 
and the second-order condition for (4) is 
  2
2 2 2
C 2 2
C C
2 0.d P dP d w d rq
dQ dq dqdQ
                                             (6) 
Moreover, we obtain 
  
2 2
C L S C L S C
2 22 2 2 2
L S C C C
( , ) ( , ) ,
2
R q q R q q dP dQ q d P dQ
q q dP dQ q d P dQ d w dq d r dq
            (7) 
where 2 2C 0dP dQ q d P dQ . 
  We can now present the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: Under quantity competition, firm C’s reaction functions are downward sloping. 
 
  Second, we consider firm L’s best response, which is defined by 
  
L
L L
L C S 0
L
( ) ( )( , ) arg max .
( )q
P Q q r q fR q q
l q
                                      (8) 
  Firm L seeks to maximize its income per worker with respect to Lq , given Cq  and Sq . The 
equilibrium solution satisfies the following conditions: The first-order condition for (8) is 
  L L
L L
0,dP dr dlq P l Pq r f
dQ dq dq
                                     (9) 
and the second-order condition for (8) is 
  
2 2 2
L L2 2 2
L L
2 0.d P dP d r d lq l Pq r f
dQ dQ dq dq
                                   (10) 
Moreover, we obtain 
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2 2
L C S L C S L L L
2 2 2 2 2 2
C S L L L L
( , ) ( , ) ( ) .
2
R q q R q q q l d P dQ l q dl dq dP dQ
q q q d P dQ dP dQ d r dq l Pq r f d l dq
 (11) 
Since 2 2L 0d l dq , L L 0l q dl dq , and thus 
2 2
L L L 0q l d P dQ l q dl dq dP dQ . 
  We now state the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: Under quantity competition, firm L’s reaction functions are upward sloping. 
 
  Third, we consider firm S’s best response, which is defined by 
  
S
S C L S S L L C C00
( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 .
Q
q
R q q P x dx w q r q w q r q w q r q f      (12) 
  Firm S attempts to maximize economic welfare with respect to Sq , given Cq  and Lq . The 
equilibrium needs to satisfy the following conditions: The first-order condition for (12) is 
  
S S
0,dw drP
dq dq
                                                          (13) 
and the second-order condition for (12) is 
  
2 2
2 2
S S
0.dP d w d r
dQ dq dq
                                                       (14) 
Moreover, we have 
  S C L S C L 2 2 2 2
C L S S
( , ) ( , ) .R q q R q q dP dQ
q q dP dQ d w d q d r d q
                       (15) 
  We present the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 3: Under quantity competition, firm S’s reaction functions are downward sloping. 
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  Finally, we make the following assumption: C L S( , )R q q , L C S( , )R q q  and S C L( , )R q q  intersect at 
one point. Note that this assumption eliminates the case where only one firm is relatively large or small 
compared to the other firms and ensures the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium. 
 
 
4. Results 
  In this section, we will consider the following three games. 
Game 1: Firm C is the leader. 
Game 2: Firm L is the leader. 
Game 3: Firm S is the leader. 
  We will discuss these games in order. 
 
Game 1 
  We consider Stackelberg mixed triopoly competition in which firm C is the leader. Firm C chooses 
Cq , and after observing Cq , firm L and firm S choose Lq  and Sq , respectively. When firm C is the 
Stackelberg leader, it chooses Cq  in order to maximize C C L C S C( , ( ), ( ))q R q R q , and firm L and firm 
S act as followers and maximize L C L C S C( , ( ), ( )q R q R q  and C L C S C( , ( ), ( )W q R q R q , respectively. 
  We now present the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the equilibrium of Stackelberg mixed triopoly competition with firm C as leader, the 
following are obtained: 
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(i) C C L C S C C C L S( , ( ), ( )) ( , , )q R q R q q q q ; 
(ii) L C L C S C( , ( ), ( )q R q R q L C L S( , , )q q q ; 
(iii) C L C S C( , ( ), ( )W q R q R q C L S( , , )W q q q . 
 
  Proposition 1 means that Game 1 may or may not be profitable for the followers. We explain the 
intuition behind this proposition using Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents firm 
C’s output, the vertical axis represents firm L’s output, iR  is firm i’s reaction curve, 
*
C  is an 
iso-profit curve, and *L  is an iso-income-per-worker curve. In Figure 2, the horizontal axis denotes 
firm C’s output, the vertical axis denotes firm S’s output, and *W  is an iso-welfare curve. For 
intuitive explanation, the figures are drawn very simply. As is shown in Figure 1, if firm C is the leader 
and firm L is the follower, then firm C’s optimal output is smaller than the Cournot output. On the 
other hand, if firm C is the leader and firm S is the follower, then firm C’s optimal output is larger than 
the Cournot output (Figure 2). In consideration of these situations, firm C chooses an output that can 
achieve the highest level of profit as the leader of the market. Therefore, if firm C decreases its output, 
firm L’s income per worker increases, while if firm C increases its output, firm L’s income per worker 
decreases. On the other hand, if firm C decreases its output, economic welfare also decreases, while if 
firm C increases its output, economic welfare also increases. 
 
Game 2 
  We consider Stackelberg competition in which firm L becomes the leader. Firm L chooses Lq , and 
after observing Lq , firm C and firm S choose Cq  and Sq , respectively. Therefore, firm L chooses 
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Lq  to maximize L C L L S L( ( ), , ( ))R q q R q , and firm C and firm S act as followers and maximize 
L C L L S L( ( ), , ( ))R q q R q  and C L L S L( ( ), , ( ))W R q q R q , respectively. 
  We now present the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium of Stackelberg mixed triopoly competition with firm L as leader, the 
following are obtained: 
(i) L C L L S L L C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )R q q R q q q q ; 
(ii) C C L L S L C C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )R q q R q q q q ; 
(iii) C L L S L C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )W R q q R q W q q q . 
 
  Proposition 2 says that Game 2 can be profitable for the leader and the welfare-maximizing follower. 
We explain the intuition behind this proposition using Figures 1 and 3. In Figure 3, the horizontal axis 
denotes firm S’s output, and the vertical axis denotes firm L’s output. As is shown in Figure 1 (resp. 
Figure 3), if firm L is the leader and firm C (resp. firm S) is the follower, then firm L’s optimal output 
is larger than the Cournot output (Figures 1 and 3). Firm L chooses an output that can achieve the 
highest level of income per worker. Therefore, since firm L increases its output, firm C’s profit 
decreases, while economic welfare improves. 
 
Game 3 
 When firm S is the Stackelberg leader, it chooses Sq  that maximizes C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )W R q R q q , and 
firm C and firm L maximize C C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )R q R q q  and L C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )R q R q q , respectively. 
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  We now present the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: In the equilibrium of Stackelberg mixed triopoly competition with firm S as leader, the 
following are obtained: 
(i) C S L S S C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )W R q R q q W q q q ; 
(ii) C C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )R q R q q C C L S( , , )q q q ; 
(iii) L C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )R q R q q C C L S( , , )q q q . 
 
  Proposition 3 says that Game 3 may or may not be profitable for the followers. The intuition behind 
this proposition is as follows. If firm S is the leader and firm C is the follower, then firm S’s optimal 
output is smaller than the Cournot output (Figure 2). On the other hand, if firm S is the leader and firm 
L is the follower, then firm S’s optimal output is larger than the Cournot output (Figure 3). In 
consideration of these situations, firm S chooses an output that maximizes economic welfare. 
Therefore, if firm S decreases its output, firm C’s profit and firm L’s income per worker increase, while 
if firm S increases its output, firm C’s profit and firm L’s income per worker decrease. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
  We have discussed the equilibrium outcomes of three sequential-move games comprising a 
capitalist firm, a labour-managed firm and a state-owned firm. We have found that if the 
labour-managed firm is the leader, then at equilibrium the labour-managed firm and the state-owned 
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firm can get more than in the Cournot game. However, we cannot have gotten such a clear result for 
the other games. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(i) The leader (firm C) chooses Cq  in order to maximize C C L C S C( , ( ), ( ))q R q R q  and it can choose 
C C
Nq q . Here the superscript ‘N’ denotes the equilibrium outcome of the Cournot-Nash game. 
Therefore, we obtain C C L C S C C C L S( , ( ), ( )) ( , , )q R q R q q q q . 
  When firm C is the leader, it maximizes C C L C S C( , ( ), ( ))q R q R q  with respect to Cq . The 
first-order condition for profit maximization is 
    SLC C C
C C C C
0.RdP dw dr dP R dPq P q q
dQ dq dq dQ q dQ q
                           (16) 
Here 0dP dQ , L C 0R q  (Lemma 2), and S C 0R q  (Lemma 3). If 
C L C C S C 0q dP dQ R q q dP dQ R q , then C C C 0q dP dQ P dw dq dr dq , 
and therefore firm C maximizes its profit by choosing C C
Nq q . On the other hand, if 
C L C C S C 0q dP dQ R q q dP dQ R q , then C C C 0q dP dQ P dw dq dr dq , 
and therefore firm C chooses C C
Nq q . 
(ii) If C C
CL Nq q , then L C L C S C L C L S( , ( ), ( ) ( , , )q R q R q q q q . Here the superscript ‘CL’ denotes the 
equilibrium outcome of the game where firm C is the leader. Since 
L C L S C L( , , ) 0q q q q q dP dQ , if C C
CL Nq q , then L C L C S C L C L S( , ( ), ( ) ( , , )q R q R q q q q , 
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while if C C
CL Nq q , then L C L C S C L C L S( , ( ), ( ) ( , , )q R q R q q q q . 
(iii) If C C
CL Nq q , then C L C S C C L S( , ( ), ( ) ( , , )W q R q R q W q q q . Since C L S C( , , )W q q q q P  
C C 0dw dq dr dq , if C C
CL Nq q , then C L C S C C L S( , ( ), ( ) ( , , )W q R q R q W q q q , while if C C
CL Nq q , 
then C L C S C C L S( , ( ), ( ) ( , , )W q R q R q W q q q . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) Since the leader (firm L) maximizes L C L L S L( ( ), , ( ))R q q R q  and it can choose L L
Nq q , we 
obtain L C L L S L L C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )R q q R q q q q . We show that L C L L S L L C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )R q q R q q q q  
by showing that L L
LL Nq q . Here the superscript ‘LL’ denotes the equilibrium outcome of the game 
where firm L is the leader. If firm L is the leader, then it maximizes L C L L S L( ( ), , ( ))R q q R q  with 
respect to Lq . The first-order condition is 
    C SL L L L
L L L L
0.R RdP dr dl dP dPq P l Pq r f q q
dQ dq dq dQ q dQ q
              (17) 
Here 0dP dQ , C L 0R q  (Lemma 1) and S L 0R q  (Lemma 3). To satisfy (17), 
L L L Lq dP dQ P dr dq l Pq r f dl dq  needs to be negative, and therefore L L
LL Nq q . 
(ii) When firm L is the Stackelberg leader, then it increases Lq  (Proposition 2 (i)). Since 
C C L S L C( , , ) / 0q q q q q dP dQ , increasing Lq  decreases C  given Cq  and Sq , and thus 
C C L L S L C C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )R q q R q q q q . 
(iii) When firm L is the leader, it increases Lq  (Proposition 2 (i)). Since 
C L S L L L( , , ) 0W q q q q P dw dq dr dq , increasing Lq  improves economic welfare given 
Cq  and Sq , and thus C L L S L C L S( ( ), , ( )) ( , , )W R q q R q W q q q . Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
(i) The leader (firm S) chooses Sq  in order to maximize economic welfare C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )W R q R q q  
and it can choose S S
Nq q . Therefore, we obtain C S L S S C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )W R q R q q W q q q . 
  When firm S is the leader, it maximizes economic welfare C S L S S( ( ), ( ), )W R q R q q  with respect to 
Sq . The first-order condition for welfare maximization is 
    C LS S
S S S S
0.Rdw dr dP dP RP q q
dq dq dQ q dQ q
                                   (18) 
Here 0dP dQ , C S 0R q  (Lemma 1), and L S 0R q  (Lemma 2). If 
S C S S L S 0q dP dQ R q q dP dQ R q , then S S 0P dw dq dr dq , and therefore 
firm S maximizes economic welfare by choosing S S
Nq q . On the other hand, if 
S C S S L S 0q dP dQ R q q dP dQ R q , then S S 0P dw dq dr dq , and therefore 
firm S chooses S S
Nq q . 
(ii) If S S
SL Nq q , then C C S L S S C C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )R q R q q q q q . Here the superscript ‘SL’ denotes the 
equilibrium outcome of the game where firm S is the Stackelberg leader. Since 
C C L S S C( , , ) 0q q q q q dP dQ , if S S
SL Nq q , then C C S L S S C C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )R q R q q q q q , 
while if S S
SL Nq q , then C C S L S S C C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )R q R q q q q q . 
(iii) If S S
SL Nq q , then L C S L S S L C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )R q R q q q q q . Since L C L S S( , , )q q q q  
L 0q dP dQ , if S S
SL Nq q , then L C S L S S L C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )R q R q q q q q , while if S S
SL Nq q , then 
L C S L S S L C L S( ( ), ( ), ) ( , , )R q R q q q q q . Q.E.D. 
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